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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is twofold: to evaluate impacts of SME financing programs of the government on employment 
in Malaysia and to draw policy implications from the analysis. This paper focuses on the financing programs through 
development financial institutions (DFIs). This study applied the instrumental variables method to deal with the problem of 
self-selection and estimate effectiveness of SME financing programs of the government. The result revealed that the support 
through DFIs did not contribute to job creation. Rather, investments in fixed assets had a positive relation with job creation 
of SMEs. This implies that SMEs increased employment as well as expenditures for fixed assets when SMEs had been 
trying to meet greater demands for goods and services in markets. This paper finally drew the following policy implication 
for better SME financing programs of the government. Public financial support should be directed to SMEs with prospects 
for business expansion, not to SMEs that are falling into decline.
Keywords: Development Financial Institutions (DFIs), Malaysia, SME financing programs, program evaluation, small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
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1. Introduction
In developing countries, encouragement of the private sector as an engine of economic growth has been a 
critical issue; however, it is not realistic to consider that local private enterprises are automatically growing. At 
the initial stage of the startup, the size of a company is most often small in terms of assets and/or employment. 
　　The government needs to take necessary steps to encourage business activities of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). The universal role of the government for SMEs is sound macroeconomic 
management. In addition to this, the government is expected to create a level playing field for the private 
sector regardless of the company size. SMEs often find it difficult to compete effectively in markets due to 
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their size; therefore, it is also essential for the government to provide policy assistance for SMEs (Nakagawa 
[2011]). 
　　Asian Development Bank [2009] put an emphasis on SMEs as engines for job creation, and the 
government should create opportunities to match potential labor with SMEs. Formerly impoverished people 
can spend money for their lives if they earn income through their jobs. This results in poverty reduction in 
developing countries. In this sense, it is a critical issue to facilitate support for SMEs in terms of employment 
generation. SMEs, however, often face difficulties in financial markets due to problems in information 
asymmetry. Private banks cannot obtain enough information to judge the viability of each SME’s project. 
Moreover, the loan amount is relatively smaller than that of large enterprises; therefore, small business loans 
are not profitable for banks. For these reasons, banks are not willing to give loans to SMEs. The government 
needs to play an important role in providing financial assistance to remove obstacles to SME’s business.
　　The Malaysian government has a long history of planning and implementing financing programs to 
encourage SMEs. One prominent feature of the case of Malaysia is that the government has been providing 
financial assistance for SMEs not only through government-funded banks, the so-called Development Financial 
Institution (DFIs), but commercial/Islamic banks, government affiliated institutions, and a Ministry (Nakagawa 
[2015]). These financing schemes, in which money must flow through complicated channels, have made 
program evaluation difficult, although the government is required to pursue accountability of the programs.
　　Based on this background, the purpose of this paper is twofold: to evaluate impacts of SME financing 
programs by the government on employment and to draw policy implications from the analysis. In other words, 
this study examines the claim of Asian Development Bank [2009], to evaluate whether SMEs supported by 
the government have generated job opportunities. If SME financing programs by the Malaysian government 
contributed to an increase of employment, the government should provide more finance for SMEs. Policy 
implications, drawn from the Malaysian experience, embody good lessons for other developing countries 
to follow. If, on the other hand, Malaya’s policy is not generating employment opportunities, the Malaysian 
government might be better to modify or reform SME financing programs. Among some channels of the SME 
financing scheme, this study focuses on the financing channel of DFIs, which have been established by the 
government to achieve particular policy goals, such as SME facilitation. DFIs simply utilize government funds 
for SME lending, while commercial/Islamic banks have accepted private deposits and they utilize private 
sources for SME loans. Therefore, on a technical aspect, it is hard to distinguish whether sources of funds of 
commercial/Islamic banking loans for SMEs are from the government or private savings. Secondly, the author 
sheds light on an impact of the government’s financial assistance on employment of SMEs. As has been noted 
earlier, government support of SMEs is expected to lead to employment generation (Asian Development Bank 
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[2009]). Therefore, the effect of government SME promotion on employment should be a primary concern.  
　　The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical argument about public 
support for SMEs, methods of program evaluation, and empirical research. Section 3 outlines SME financing 
assistance implemented by the Malaysian government. This section demonstrates that the government has 
tried to pursue two goals under SME development policies simultaneously: poverty alleviation of Bumiputera 
communities and economic development. Then, section 4 illustrates an analytical framework. The following 
section interprets the result of the empirical analysis. This part reveals that SME financing programs by the 
government did not show positive evidence of increased levels of employment of SMEs. Rather, investments 
in fixed assets had a positive impact on employment. From this empirical result, the last section summarizes 
this paper and draws policy implications. The author also points out further directions for this research.
2.  Literature Review
2.1.  Theoretical Review of SME Financing by the Government1）
This section reviews theoretical discussion regarding the government’s financial assistance for SMEs. The 
most reasonable cause for the government to support SMEs is related to strategies to deal with a market 
failure due to a problem of asymmetric information. It occurs when two parties, a seller and a buyer, don’t 
have the same amount of information about goods and services traded in a market. In the context of SMEs 
in a loan market, they know their financial situation and business risks; however, it is sometimes difficult for 
banks to obtain correct and  comprehensive information of SMEs due to some reasons, such as insufficient 
accounting and disclosure systems in the economy. In this situation, banks are hesitant about providing loans 
to SMEs. Therefore, many SMEs need to do business under tight financial constraint due to unbalanced 
information between borrower (SMEs) and lender (banks) in the loan market.
　　A shortage of collateral is another problem of SMEs. It causes more serious challenges for SMEs to 
finance their business. Collateral plays a crucial role in the loan market to solve the problem of asymmetric 
information. Banks have the possibility of recovering the principal and interest of the loan if they sell off 
collateral under SMEs’ default in repayment of the loan. This means that collateral reduces risks of loans 
to SMEs and they can borrow more money from banks if they have more collateral. Many SMEs, however, 
sometimes suffer from having fewer assets for collateral.
　　Furthermore, banks find it difficult to enjoy economy of scale in lending to SMEs. The principal loan 
1） For more details, please refer to Nakagawa [2012] summarizing the theoretical argument for government support for 
SMEs.
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amount is smaller than that for large enterprises. This, coupled with SMEs’ reduced security, leads to excess 
demand over supply of loans in the banking sector. As a result, SMEs are generally not able to obtain enough 
financing to continue or expand their businesses. 
　　For these reasons, the loan market often fails to allocate funds effectively and efficiently. Castillo, et. al. 
[2010] agrees that policy assistance for SMEs is necessary to find a solution to difficulties in the loan market for 
SMEs.
2.2  Empirical Studies of Program Evaluation 
As noted in the first section, the purpose of this research is to evaluate whether the SME financing programs 
of the Malaysian government to SMEs were effective for generating job opportunities. Program evaluation is 
significant for the government to show accountability of their activities; however, it has often been executed 
improperly even in developed countries. Storey [1998] reviewed program evaluation of small business 
promotion in OECD countries and argued that the governments only monitored and did not evaluate the 
programs (Storey [1998], p. 35). 
　　Recent development of methodology for program evaluation since the 1990s enables us to estimate the 
effect of government programs. There are two categories of program evaluation: randomized field experiment 
and quasi-experiments. These methods have become popular in labor economics and development economics; 
however, fewer studies related to SME promotion have applied these evaluation methods (McKenzie [2009], 
p. 227). In an experimental design, a sample is divided into two groups, treatment and control groups, by a 
statistical method. Propensity score matching (PSM) is one prevalent method in which relevant information 
related to particular subjects̶such as operation years, ownership, location, and others̶are applied to 
groupings. After grouping with the PSM method, a researcher observes an impact of a program on the 
treatment group and compares it with the control group. This analysis is focusing on differences of policy 
impacts between treatment and control groups, so it is called a difference-in-difference (DID) method. 
　　Lerner [1999] refers the PSM for grouping and compares the impact of subsidies on employment and 
sales of SMEs in the U.S. manufacturing sector. This research showed that the subsidy program positively 
contributed to employment and sales. Benavente, Crespi, and Maffioli [2007] conducted program evaluation 
of subsidies for a technology development program in Chile. The analysis found that the grant had a positive 
impact on process innovation; however, its impact on new product development was not statistically 
significant. In addition, the government financial support was effective on employment, sales, and exports; 
however, there was no influence on productivity. DeNegri, Maffioli, Rodrigues, and Vázquez [2011] analyzed 
effects of the government’s financing programs on employment, export, and labor productivity in Brazil from 
－ 85 －
The Effect of SME Financing Programs on Job Opportunities in Malaysia: A Panel-Data Analysis
1997 to 2007. The research pointed out that the programs had positive effects on employment and export; 
however, the result related to labor productivity was statistically insignificant.
　　Uesugi, Uchida, and Mizusugi [2014] analyzed effectiveness of SME financing programs through Japan 
Finance Corporation, a government-owned financial institution, on business performance of SMEs in Japan. 
The focal point of this research was to understand results of the programs on investments in fixed assets, 
employment, and profitability. The authors first divided the study subject into treatment and control groups 
by the PSM method, then conduced the DID analysis. The estimation reported that the programs had positive 
impacts on investments in fixed assets and employment. This study seemed to be successful in reflecting the 
real situation of SMEs in Japan; however, it has difficulty in reproducing the analysis due to the unpublished 
raw data used in the study.
　　In program evaluation, the most critical issue is how to correct selectivity bias̶in other words, self-
selection problems̶in econometrics. Wooldridge [2013] explains “[l]iterally, the term comes from the fact 
that individuals self-select into certain behaviors or programs: participation is not randomly determined” 
(Wooldridge [2013], p. 255). In the context of the government’s financing programs for SMEs, eligibility 
criteria set by the government cause a self-selection problem. Only SMEs fulfilling the criteria have a chance 
to apply for the program and some other SMEs are excluded from the data set under the sample selection 
process. The exclusion of the data set causes a problem in estimation. In order to deal with self-selection 
problems, Storey [1998] suggested a panel data analysis with the two-step Heckman estimation, the so-
called Heckit method. Roper and Hewitt-Dundas [2001] utilized the Heckit method to analyze the effects of 
subsidies to SMEs in Ireland during 1991-1994. As a result, the authors discovered that the subsidy programs 
had positive impacts on performance of SMEs in the country; however, the analysis did not confirm any 
statistically significant impacts on sales and profit rates. 
　　Ibarrarán, Maffioli, and Stucchi [2009] was a unique study conducting program evaluation with cross 
section data. This study applied a few methods to analyze the impact of SME policies on productivity with 
specific focus on Latin American and Caribbean countries in 2006. First, they analyzed the impact by utilizing 
the instrumental variables method. The result of the estimation was not statistically significant. Second, the 
Heckit method showed some statistically significant results. Assistance of the government on human resource 
training, obtaining ISO (International Organization for Standardization) certification, and product innovation for 
SMEs showed larger impacts than that of large enterprises. The results contain two important implications. First, 
the result of program evaluation varied according to methodology applied. Second, cross section analysis may 
cause misinterpretation. There might be a time-lag to show some changes due to the government’s program, so 
the study suggested the panel data analysis was more appropriate for program evaluation. 
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　　The instrumental variables (IVs) estimation is another acceptable approach to solve endogenous 
regressions, including the self-selection problem, although it is hard to find IVs in practice. IVs must 
satisfy three conditions. First, the IV does not appear in the estimation equation. Second, IVs must have no 
correlation with the error term in the equation. Third, IVs need correlation with endogenous independent 
variables (Wooldridge [2013], p. 850). In other words, IVs have an influence on a dependent variable through 
endogenous independent variables. 
　　Some studies are notable because they were able to tackle the difficulty of finding reasonable IVs. 
Wallsten [2000] examined the effect of the U.S. federal subsidy on R&D activities of SMEs during 1990 
and 1992 with the IV method. As a result, the study found that there was a positive relationship between 
subsidies and employment. The research also pointed out that the program might cause a crowd-out of private 
investments in R&D, however. 
　　Nemoto, Fukanuma, and Watanabe [2006] investigated one role of financing programs on business 
performance of SMEs in Japan. This research directed its attention to young SMEs from 1980 to 2003 and 
conducted a panel data analysis to confirm the impact of the program on growth of SMEs. They revealed that 
at the initial stage of their business, the growth rate of SMEs with the government’s support was relatively 
lower than that of SMEs receiving loans from private banking institutions; however, it slowly started to 
increase the growth rate as time passed. 
　　Behr, Norden, and Noth [2013] also applied the IV method to test whether state-owned banks could help 
SMEs ease financial constraints in Germany. SMEs often face financial problems as they continue or expand 
their business. This paper utilized firm-level data in Germany from 1995 to 2007 and concluded that state-
owned banks contributed to alleviation of financial constraints of SMEs by 3-10%, if SMEs increased the 
ratio of loans from state-owned banks to total loans by 10%. The analysis, however, concluded that loans of 
private banks did not mitigate financial constraints of SMEs. 
3.  SME Financing Programs in Malaysia 
3.1  Background of Small Business Assistance
Since the 1950s, the government of Malaysia has supported small business in various ways, such as human 
resource development, research and development, product improvement, financial assistance, and so on. In the 
early stage of assistance, the purpose was emphasized as poverty alleviation of Malay and indigenous people 
in Malaysia, the so-called Bumiputera, who are the majority ethnic group in the country2）. It pointed out that 
2） Demographic structure in Malaysia consists of Malay, Chinese, Indian, and indigenous people in Malaysia. The gov-
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income level of most Bumiputera was lower than that of other ethnic groups. The government recognized that 
it was important to solve economic inferiority of Bumiputera. In order to deal with this issue, the government 
focused on two aspects: the development of rural areas, where relatively more Bumiputera were resident, and the 
promotion of small business, which was expected to encourage Bumiputera participation in business activities. 
　　In the 1970s, the government became eager to support Bumiputera through small business development. 
One significant trigger was a riot in 1969, which was caused by income disparity among ethnic groups. 
In 1971, the government launched the New Economic Policy (NEP) to upgrade the economic position of 
Bumiputera. Since then, the Bumiputera-oriented policies embodied in the NEP and later policies have had 
great impacts on every aspect of the Malaysian economy.
　　The government has expanded the scope of small business development since the mid-1980s. Malaysia 
enjoyed massive inflows of foreign direct investments and accepted multinational manufacturing corporations 
to promote export-oriented industrialization. This became an enormous opportunity for Malaysia to facilitate 
SMEs supplying parts to multinational corporations, so the government expanded the target of assistance to 
SMEs in the manufacturing sector.
　　After 2000, the most relevant issue for the government has become to achieve “Vison 2020”, which 
specifies three main goals for Malaysia to become a fully developed country in terms of income level as well 
as psychological health and national dignity. The government announced that more than 6% of economic 
growth for consecutive years was crucial to become a fully developed country (Economic Planning Unit [2010], 
pp. 68-70), and small business development was highlighted as a priority area expected to perform its role as 
an engine of economic growth and development. Even after the millennium, the aim of SME development in 
Malaysia has had two core goals: to balance income level among ethnic groups, in particular Bumiputera, and 
to achieve economic development.
3.2  Financial Assistance for Small Business
A SME census conducted in 2010 concluded that many SMEs were limited and depending on two financing 
channels: self-finance and borrowing from friends and/or family members (Department of Statistics [2012]). 
Financing through these channels is often insufficient for a large-scale investment in business. Besides, many 
SMEs cannot receive ample loans from private banks. Therefore, government SME financing programs are 
indispensable for doing business. 
ernment of Malaysia categorized Malay and indigenous people as “Bumiputera,” accounting for 60% of its population. 
The concept of “Bumiputera” has had significant impacts on politics, economy, and other issues in Malaysia.
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　　Table 1 shows SME financing programs through DFIs and government agencies in Malaysia, and 
the programs have been provided by 25 institutions, including development financial institutions (DFIs), 
government-owned institutions, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), and a Ministry. The total number of programs 
were 147 as of March 2017, of which 87 programs were provided by DFIs. Among them, Export-Import Bank 
of Malaysia Bhd. supplied the largest number of programs (30 programs) for small business finance. SME Bank 
Malaysia Bhd., Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd. (Agrobank) and Credit Guarantee Corporation provided 10 or 
more programs (19, 14, and 10 programs respectively). Regarding program type, some institutions had multiple 
types, for example, Malaysian Technology Development Corporation set three types of programs: loan, grant, 
and guarantee. Perbadanan Nasional Bhd. also supplied three types of programs: loan, grant, and venture capital.
Table 1.  SME financing programs through DFIs and government agencies in Malaysia
Institution No. ofProgram
Program Type
Loan Grant Guarantee Venture capital
Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia 1 ✓
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd. 3 ✓
Bank Negara Malaysia 4 ✓
Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Bhd. 2 ✓
Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd. 14 ✓
Bank Simpanan Nasional 3 ✓
Cradle Fund Sdn. Bhd. 1 ✓
Credit Guarantee Corporation 10 ✓ ✓
Export-Import Bank of Malaysia Bhd. 30 ✓ ✓
Kumpulan Modal Perdana Sdn. Bhd. 1 ✓
Majlis Amanah Rakyat 5 ✓ ✓
Malaysia Debt Ventures Bhd. 2 ✓
Malaysia Venture Capital Management Bhd. 5 ✓
Malaysian Biotechnology Corporation 1 ✓
Malaysian Green Technology Corporation 2 ✓
Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Bhd. 6 ✓
Malaysian Technology Development Corporation 8 ✓ ✓ ✓
Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation 4 ✓
Perbadanan Nasional Bhd. 9 ✓ ✓ ✓
Perbadanan Usahawan Nasional Bhd. 5 ✓
PROKHAS Sdn. Bhd./ Syarikat Jaminan Pembiayaan Perniagaan Bhd. 2 ✓
Sarawak Economic Development Corporation 1 ✓
SME Bank Malaysia Bhd. 19 ✓
SME Corporation Malaysia 3 ✓
TEKUN Nasional 6 ✓
Total 147 19 4 5 4
Source: SME Corp. Malaysia
　　　 (https://www.smecorp.gov.my/index.php/en/programmes/2015-12-21-09-39-08/access-to-financing, last cited on 
March 21, 2018).
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4.  Analytical Framework and Data 
4.1  Analytical Framework
4.1.1  Instrumental Variables and Two-Stage Least Squares Methods
The most difficult aspect in conducting program evaluation is to select an appropriate method. The World Bank 
[2012] published quantitative methods of impact evaluation with specific focus on financial assistance for SMEs3）. 
It declared that there are various options open to evaluators if impact evaluation is planned before execution of the 
program. The experimental design is ideal; however, it often has ethical problems in practice. Furthermore, many 
conditions have affected program evaluation. In most cases, the government does not plan to conduct program 
evaluation. This causes serious problems due to insufficient data and information for evaluation. 
　　A self-selection problem may arise from the nature of government SME financing programs. The 
government usually sets criteria for their financial support, such as industry, usage of funds, and so on. SMEs 
can apply for public credit programs only if they fulfill the criteria. Thus, it is impossible to implement the 
programs for randomly selected SMEs, which results in a bias of empirical analysis. 
　　This study employs the IV methods to solve the problem for the following reasons. First, SME 
financing programs of the government have not planned quantitative evaluation. Experimental approaches 
or randomized control trials are not suitable for this analysis. Second, this study randomly collected firm-
level data from financial statements, and it is very hard to collect enough data for categorizing treatment and 
control groups. For these reasons, the IV method is optimal for this study.
　　The regression equation is written as follows, where x and u are correlated4）. 
　　　y =β0+β1 x + u, where Cov (x, u) ≠ 0（Equation 1)
　　In ordinary least squares (OLS), x and u should not be correlated to obtain solid estimations. The IV 
method, however, is useful to obtain compatible estimations of β0 and β1 in the case that x is correlated with u. 
If it is possible to observe another variable z which fulfills at least the following two conditions, z can be used 
as an instrumental variable for x. 
3） International development financial institutions, such as the World Bank, often use the term “impact evaluation”, which 
is the same as program evaluation in this study. Impact evaluation focuses more on the effect of foreign aid programs. 
On the other hand, program evaluation covers a broader sense of the effect of government policies.
4） This part is based on Wooldridge [2013], Chapter 15, pp. 514-515.
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　　　Condition 1: Cov (z, u) = 0  
　　　Condition 2: Cov (z, x) ≠0  
　　The first condition means that z and u are not correlated, the other is that z is correlated with x. It means 
that the instrumental variable z can influence y through x. A simple regression to test z and x is useful to check 
whether z is correlated with x (Equation 2).
　　　x =π0 +π1 z + v（Equation 2)
If π1≠0, condition 2 is valid, because π1 is expressed as Cov(z, x)/Var (z). The null hypothesis (H0 :π1 = 
0) can be rejected against the alternative hypothesis (H1 :π1≠0) at a substantially significant level. In this 
circumstance, it is plausible to consider that condition 2 is valid.
　　In empirical studies in the field of social science, finding the best instrumental variables is challenging. 
Economic issues, for example, involve various factors, which are interrelated as well. Hence the two stage 
least squares (2SLS) is better to apply to an empirical study when one independent variable may have more 
than two instrumental variables. 
　　The method of the 2SLS starts with the following regression equation5）. 
　　　y1 =β0 +β1 y2 +β2 z1 +β3 z2 + u1（Equation 3)
where z1 and z2 in equation 3 are exogenous and suppose there are more exogenous variables, z3 and z4 for 
example, which are not included in equation 3. Equation 3 can be estimated by OLS if y2 does not correlate with 
u1. To confirm whether y2 is endogenous, a comparison of OLS and 2SLS estimates is viable as Hausman [1978] 
indicated. If the estimation of OLS and 2SLS are different with a statistical significance, it is clear that y2 is 
endogenous, which means the zj are exogenous. The following equation 4 is estimated to verify this point.   
　　　y2 =π0 +π1 z1 +π2 z2 +π3 z3 +π4 z4 + v2（Equation 4)
A primary concern here is whether v2 and u1 are uncorrelated. If v2 is not correlated with u1, it is fair to 
describe y2 is not correlated with u1 because each zj does not correlate with u1. u1 is expressed as equation 5, 
5） This part is based on Wooldridge [2013], Chapter 15, pp. 534-535.
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where e1 does not correlate with v2 and has zero mean. u1 and v2 are not correlated on condition that δ1 = 0.
　　　u1 =δ1 v2 + e1（Equation 5) 
v2, however, is the error term and unobserved, then the reduced form for y2 needs to be estimated by OLS to 
obtain the reduced form residuals of v2. Equation 3 can be modified by substituting equation 5 for equation 3.
　　　y1 =β0 +β1 y2 +β2 z1 +β3 z2 +δ1 v2  + error（Equation 6)
A null hypothesis to test here is H0 :δ1 = 0. If H0 is rejected at a statistically significant level, endogeneity of 
y2 is satisfactorily confirmed since v2 and u1 are not correlated. The test of H0 is conducted by utilizing a t test. 
In case of multiple independent variables, the reduced form of each dubious endogenous variable is estimated 
to obtain the reduced form residuals. Afterwards, joint significance of all residuals in the structural form are 
investigated with an F test.
4.1.2  Test of Overidentification Restrictions
As has been explained in the previous section, the 2SLS is a more reasonable method when multiple endogenous 
variables are suspected in the model. For example, in a multiple independent variables model in a social science, 
each independent variable may have several possible IVs. In this case, the 2SLS method must consider an 
overidentification problem, which arises in cases where the number of independent variables is not the same as that 
of instrumental and exogeneous variables. An analysis must confirm whether all IVs are not redundant6）.
　　Suppose a general case that there are q more instruments than parameters to estimate; in other words, 
the number of endogenous independent variables subtracted from the number of IVs is q. For instance, three 
possible IVs for one endogenous independent variable, the overidentification problem occurs as q=3-1=2. If q 
is more than two, making a comparison of several IV estimates is too complicated. It is rather fine to conduct 
a simple test based on the 2SLS residuals. A fundamental idea of this is that if all IVs are exogenous, the 
6） In other words, the number of endogenous and exogenous variables in the whole system is “M” and “K” respectively, 
whereas the number of endogenous and exogenous variable in a particular model is “m” and “k”, the following three 
cases are specified (Matuura & Mckenzie [2001], pp. 196-197). 
 m+k-1<K, or M-1<(M+K)-(m+k): over-identification 
 m+k-1>K, or M-1>(M+K)-(m+k): under-identification 
 If m+k-1=K or M-1=(M+K)-(m+k), the identification problem does not occur.
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2SLS residuals is not correlated with IVs (Wooldridge [2013], p. 536). 
　　Redundancy of IVs are examined by the Sargan test, in which IVs are uncorrelated with the structural 
error term. Wooldridge [2013] describes three steps to test overidentifying restrictions. First, the structural 
model is estimated by 2SLS to obtain residuals of the 2SLS. Next, a regression of the residuals on all 
exogenous variables is conducted and the R-squared (R2) is obtained. Then, whether the null hypothesis is 
rejected or not is examined. Here, the null hypothesis (H0) is that all IVs are not correlated with the residuals, 
nR1
2~xq
2, where q is a difference between the number of IVs and that of endogenous independent variables. 
If nR1
2 is greater than the 5% critical value in the xq
2 distribution, H0 can be rejected. It is satisfactory for 
confirming that some IVs are not exogenous (Wooldridge [2013], p. 537).    
4.2  Data 
Data utilized in this paper was collected from audited financial statements of companies submitted to the 
Companies Commission of Malaysia, namely Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM)7）. The audited financial 
statements contain a balance sheet, an income statement, a cash flow statement, and a statement of changes in 
equity, and notes to financial statements. The SSM also has other information such as members of boards of 
directors, start-up date, significant changes of company, etc.
　　As for data collection, financial statements from 1999 to 2015 of 341 SMEs were randomly selected 
from an open access directory of SME Corp. Malaysia. In Malaysia, there is a well-developed accounting and 
disclosure system for listed companies. This, however, is not necessarily the same for unlisted companies, 
including SMEs. Financial statements of many SMEs don’t include all necessary information for this analysis. 
For example, some companies haven’t disclosed the number of employees, because it is not compulsory 
information for an annual audit of financial statements. For these reasons, this study conducts an empirical 
analysis on unbalanced panel data.
4.3  Empirical Model: Contribution to Employment Generation
This study carries out an empirical analysis to confirm the impact of SME financing programs by the 
Malaysian government on employment generation. SMEs that enjoy the benefit of financing programs have 
7） SSM is an agency under the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and Consumerism. The agency started its oper-
ation in April 2002, as a result of a merger between the Registrar of Companies and the Registrar of Business in Malay-
sia. Companies under relevant laws need to register with SSM and listed and unlisted companies are required to submit 
substantial documents, including audited financial statements, to SSM. For more details about the agency, please visit 
their website (https://www.ssm.com.my/en).
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greater possibilities for easing financial constraints on their operations, which may result in them being able to 
hire more labor to expand their business. The growth rate of employment is utilized as a dependent variable, 
and the SME financing dummy, the growth rate of fixed asset and revenue are exploited as independent 
variables. The last two variables are closely related to employment. An increase of fixed asset has both 
positive and negative effects on employment. If a private company increases an investment in labor-saved 
fixed assets, it may cause a decrease of employment. On the other hand, if the private company increases an 
investment in fixed assets, such as machines or machinery, which need more labor for operation, the company 
may cause an increase of employment. With regard to revenue, an increase of revenue may result in relaxing 
financial constraint; therefore, the company may be able to hire more labor. In addition, the models include 
regional dummies following five classifications of the Malaysian government: North, Central, South, East, 
and Borneo8）. The core interest of this model is the coefficient of β1, which is expected to be positive if the 
government’s SME financing programs contributed to an increase in employment.
　　　G(emp)i, t =β0+β1govi, t+β2G(FA)i, t +β3G(rev)i, t + ui, t          (1)
　　Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables after removing outlier data identified by 
the Grubbs Test. Standard deviation of ROA (0.1024) is the smallest, whereas that of GDP (2.2652) was the 
biggest. The GDP growth rate varies more than other variables9）. 
8） The north area covers State of Perlis, Kedah, Penang, and Perak. The central area covers State of Selangor, Negri Sem-
bilan, Malacca, and Federal districts (Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya, and Labuan). The south area covers State of Johor. 
East area covers State of Kelantan, Terengganu, and Pahang. The Borneo area covers State of Sabah and Sarawak.
9） Unless otherwise noticed, EViews 9.5 was utilized for estimation in this research.
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics
G(emp) gov G(FA) G(rev) race DFI_ratio ROA bank GDP
Mean 0.0309 0.0974 0.0796 0.0710 0.4000 2.2908 0.0207 0.5500 5.0835
Median 0 0 -0.0169 0.0568 0 2.4463 0.0208 1 5.5
Maximum 1.5163 1 2.1559 2.3313 1 3.1892 0.5012 1 7.4248
Minimum -1.1632 0 -1.9790 -2.1225 0 0.8580 -0.4503 0 -1.5137
Std. Dev. 0.3052 0.2966 0.45091 0.4249 0.4901 0.6603 0.1024 0.4977 2.2652
Observations 1140
Notes:  Variables are defined as follows: emp is the number of employees, gov is a dummy variable of direct credit provided 
for SMEs, race is a dummy variable of Bumiputera, who were appointed as members of boards of directors, FA is the 
amount of fixed assets, rev is revenue, DFI_ratio is the share of DFIs branches to the total number of bank branches 
per state, ROA is return of assets, bank is a business relation dummy with commercial/Islamic banks, GDP is the 
GDP growth rate. G( ) denotes the growth rate of each variable. 
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　　This study sets seven instrumental variables against three independent variables. Race is a dummy variable 
for Bumiputera on boards of directors. Nakagawa [2018] revealed that race and return on assets (ROA) had 
positive relations with gov, a dummy variable of the SME financing programs, therefore, these variables are 
plausive IVs. This paper follows Behr, Norden, and Noth [2013] and applies DFI_ratio, indicating the share 
of branches of DFIs relative to the total number of all bank branches per state. SMEs are likely to have more 
chances to access financial support from the government if more branches of DFIs are located in the same state. 
Bank is a dummy variable for a business relation between commercial and/or Islamic banks and SMEs. SMEs 
with more business relations with commercial and/or Islamic banks are better able to ease financial constraint 
in their business. As for GDP, it is obvious that sales by companies depend on the economic situation; GDP 
growth rate has a positive impact on revenue of SMEs. In addition to these variables, this analysis applies 
lagged variables of fixed assets and revenue because lagged variables are often included in the IV method. Most 
essential, these IVs must be exogenous to the dependent variable of each enterprise, as has been explained in 4.1. 
　　As for the first step of the analysis, this paper conducted a test to identify endogeneity of independent 
variables in a regression model as explained in 4.1. If independent variables in a multivariate regression model 
are endogenous, the variables are correlated with u and the result of the analysis has a problem of credibility. 
Endogeneity occurs in one of three ways: omitted variables, measurement error, and simultaneity (Wooldridge 
[2010], pp. 54-55). In addition to this, sample selection bias is another cause of endogeneity in a model. This study 
deals with SME financing programs given by the government, in which they usually set criteria of financial support 
for SMEs. Recipients of the support are not randomly selected, and this process results in sample selection bias10）. 
It may be safer to check endogeneity of independent variables to obtain a robust result of the analysis.
　　The analytical model of this research contains multiple independent variables, so the study needs to start 
with an estimation of the reduced form for each suspected endogenous variable and acquire the reduced form 
residuals. The null hypothesis (H0) of the test is that independent variables are not exogenous  (H0 :β1+β2+ 
β3=0). Table 3 shows a result of the endogeneity test, the so-called Wald test, that the null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 5% statistical level, which means that all independent variables of model (1) are endogenous. 
10） Sample selection bias is a “bias in the OLS estimator which is induced by using data that arise from endogenous 
sample selection” (Wooldridge [2013], p. 857).
Table 3．Result of the Wald test
Null hypothesis: β1＝β2＝β3=0
F-statistic 3.6023 Probability 0.0131
Chi-square 10.8069 Probability 0.0128
Source: Author’s estimation.
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5.  Results of the Empirical Analysis
The estimates of model (1) with instrumental variables are shown as Table 4. As Table 4(2) shows, the growth 
rate of fixed assets had a positive relation with that of employment at a statistically significant level, although 
a sign of fixed assets was expected to be negative because fixed assets can be a substitute for labor, in 
general. For one reason, most fixed assets possessed by SMEs in Malaysia are shop-houses and/or plants, not 
labor-saving equipment, such as robots or automation of factories. The result implies that SMEs increasing 
investments in fixed assets tried to expand their production facilities in response to sales, and those SMEs 
are attempting to increase the number of employees. The coefficient of gov, however, appears statistically 
insignificant, representing that SMEs financing programs of the government had not contributed to the growth 
rate of employment. As the author explained earlier, the government can justify providing financial support 
for SMEs from a viewpoint of employment generation by quoting an argument of the Asian Development 
Bank [2009]. However, in the case of Malaysia, the empirical analysis unfortunately resulted in no positive 
relation between government’s financial support and the employment growth rate at SMEs. 
Table 4.  Results of analyses1
Dependent Variable
G(emp)
(1) OLS (2) IV
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
gov 0.0427 0.0236 * 0.1629 0.1554
G(FA) 0.0764 0.0206 *** 0.5972 0.2313 ***
G(rev) 0.1248 0.0206 *** -0.3500 0.2368
Constant 0.0097 0.0109 -0.0136 0.0242
Regional dummy Yes Yes
F-statistic 12.2944 *** 3.6388 ***
F-test first stage (gov) 13.3787 ***
F-test first stage (G(FA)) 7.4620 ***
F-test first stage (G(rev)) 6.9670 ***
S.E. of regression 0.4041
Second-Stage SSR 87.9708
Prob(J-statistic) 0.3488
Sample (adjusted) 1999-2015 2004-2015
Periods included 17 12
Observations 1429 1060
Instrument specification race, DFI_ratio, ROA, G(FA(-1)),
BANK, G(REV(-1)), GDP, 
NORTH, SOUTH, EAST,
BORNEO, C
Notes: 1. White period standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
2. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Source: Author’s estimation. 
－ 96 －
　　Since the analytical model consists of more IVs than the number of independent variables, seven IVs per 
three independent variables, overidentification restrictions need to be tested, as has been noted in 4.1.2. The 
validity of instrumental variables is secured only if those variables are exogenous. Residuals of 2SLS were 
regressed with exogeneous and instrumental variables, then the p-value was inspected. A null hypothesis (H0) 
in this case is that instrumental variables are exogeneous. The overidentification restrictions test follows the 
procedure explained in 4.1.2 and Wooldridge [2013]. Table 5 shows the Sargan statistic, indicating 4.4812 at 
p-value of 0.3448. It concludes that H0 is rejected and that it is fair to declare that instrumental variables are 
exogeneous. Moreover, the test suggested that there is no overidentification problem.    
6.  Summary and Policy Implications
The Malaysian government has implemented SME development programs for a long time. Private local 
companies have been expected to be an engine of economic activities in the country and the government 
emphasized SME facilitation for their economic development. In the case of Malaysia, it is notable that the 
government has connected SME development and poverty alleviation of Bumiputra. SME financing programs 
have been focused on the development of Bumiputera communities. This idea has been a fundamental 
principle of the SME promotion policy in the country.
　　Financial support has been one of the most significant measures of SME facilitation. A noteworthy 
feature of SME financing programs in Malaysia is that monetary assistance has been provided through various 
financial and government institutions. This study focused on financial support of the government through 
DFIs as an initial procedure of program evaluation. 
　　The 2SLS method with IVs was applied for the empirical analysis to solve a self-selection problem. 
The result indicated that the government financial support for SMEs through DFIs did not contribute to job 
creation. Rather, investments in fixed assets had a positive relation with job creation by SMEs. This implies 
that SMEs increased employment as well as expenditures for fixed assets when SMEs have been trying to 
meet greater demands for goods and services in markets. 
　　The SME financing support has likely been focusing on ethnicity, as Nakagawa [2018] revealed that 
DFIs have been providing financial assistance mostly for SMEs with Bumiputera Board members. This 
study, as a result of the analysis shown in table 4(2), suggests that it is possible to draw an important policy 
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implication for better SME financing programs in the country. The government should review the ethnicity-
based financial assistance and the public financial support should be directed to SMEs with prospects for 
business expansion, which are expected to hire more labor. In order to provide effective financial assistance, 
the government needs to inspect SMEs and their business circumstances; for example, contents of a project, 
business status, character of the CEO and board members, financial situation, and other information of SMEs 
must be examined as much as possible, then SMEs need to be screened very carefully. This can also bring 
about the additional positive effect of better accountability of the government programs. 
　　Moreover, the analysis implies that the government should reconsider whether financial assistance for 
SMEs is a good means to achieve two different goals referred in section 3: to balance income level among 
ethnic groups, in particular Bumiputera, and to achieve economic development. The former goal cannot 
be realized unless financial assistance of the government contributes to job opportunities for Bumiputera. 
The latter one may not be attained if the government puts a too much emphasis on ethnicity, because 
SMEs managed by other ethnic groups with high potential to expand their business may be excluded from 
government assistance. 
　　As a final remark, further analysis regarding government financial assistance through commercial/Islamic 
banks is necessary to discuss the effectiveness of the government financing programs. As has been mentioned, 
the Malaysian government has been providing financing programs for SMEs through various financial 
institutions, not only DFIs focused in this study but commercial/Islamic banks and so on. In addition, many 
SMEs receiving financial support of the government have had business relationships with commercial/Islamic 
banks. Therefore, further analysis may help us understand more detailed effects of SME finance in the country.   
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